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ABSTRACT  
 
 
It is commonly contended that international legal regime aims at promoting equality 
between states and helping underdeveloped states develop. Amongst the methods that have 
been argued to promote economic development is increased patent protection. Proponents 
of the patent regime argue that increased protection will increase foreign direct investment 
in different sectors of developing countries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, as well as 
allow for the spread of technology and known how. However, as the thesis will show this 
has not been the case. The thesis will demonstrate how the current international legal 
regime has a Eurocentric bias that works to the benefit developed and against developing 
states. Therefore, perpetuating a cycle of underdevelopment, poverty and inequality, within 
developing states. Specifically, this argument is made through an analysis of the patent 
regime and its effects on access to pharmaceuticals, which demonstrates how increased 
patent protection, especially under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Treaty, has resulted in the is lack of access to medicine in developing countries.  
Consequently, people in underdeveloped countries remain sick, unproductive, and 
experience high mortality rates from curable diseases, which directly affects the economic 
development of those developing states.  
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Introduction 
Better health is central to human happiness and well-being.  
It also makes an important contribution to economic progress,  
as healthy populations live longer, are more productive.1 
 
The economic development of a nation requires several aspects that contribute 
to the progress of such nation, one of which is a healthy workforce. A proper 
healthcare system is necessary to maintaining a healthy population and a healthy 
workforce, which essential for the state’s economic growth and progress. Research 
conducted by the World Bank confirms that health affects human welfare and directly 
effects income, productivity of workers, the savings and investments levels in a state, 
education of children and the lifespan cycle of a population which affects the 
workforce cycle.2  A healthy population requires adequate healthcare, an important 
part of which is access and availability of medicine.  Unfortunately, some parts of the 
world suffer from the lack of access to even the most basic medicine and healthcare. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates that a third of the population of 
developing countries have no access to medicine on a regular basis, with spending on 
medicine accounting for a huge portion of the expenditure within developing states’ 
budgets.3 Contradictory, medicine constitutes only 17% of imports in developing 
countries. This variation between percentage of imported medicine and expenditure is 
a result of high prices of imported medicine.4 High prices of medicine is directly 
related to patent rights over pharmaceutical and other health care products. Patency 
rights of non-duplication in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
1 World Health Organization: Heath and Development http://www.who.int/hdp/en/  (Last visited 1 
October 2015). 
2 David E. Bloom & David Canning, Population Health and Economic Growth (2008), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/489960-
1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_24_Population_Health_Economic_Growth.pdf
. 
3 World Bank: Health Expenditure http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS (Last 
Visited 1 October 2015). 
4 World Health Organization: Access to Medicine http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story002/en/ 
(Last visited 1 October 2015). 
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Treaty (TRIPS), prevents the generic production of patented medicine. This 
accompanied by high prices of medicine, result in the lack of access to medicine in 
developing countries.  Consequently, people in underdeveloped countries remain sick, 
unproductive, and experience high mortality rates from curable diseases. The WTO 
estimates that 185 million people are infected with Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), a curable 
disease that kills almost 500,000 people per year, most of whom are in developing 
countries.5 Although HCV is a highly preventative disease, “less than 4% of all people 
who inject drugs have access to HCV treatment”.6 HIV is another disease where 71% 
of infected people live in developing countries, most of whom do not have access to 
treatment, and with a growing number of 2.1 million newly infected individuals per 
year. Although it is not a curable disease, effective treatment with antiretroviral drugs 
can control the virus so that infected people can enjoy healthy and productive lives.  
The availability of medicines, or lack thereof, is directly related to aspects of 
trade, the availability of materials, the know-how of production of such medicine, and 
dissemination of the technology and information of its production. Trade affects the 
importation of actual medications or materials that help in the production of such 
medication, while the availability of know-how, technology and information helps in 
the process of locally produced medicines. If one of those elements is missing, a state 
faces a lack of availability of medicine for its population. This is directly dependent 
on different fields of international law including trade law and economic law.   
 
5 Marie-Paule Kieny, Opening remarks at the joint WHO, WIPO and WTO technical symposium on 
innovation and access to medical technologies – challenges and opportunities for middle-income 
countries, World Health Organization, November 5, 2014, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/news/mk_technical_symposium/en/. 
6 Odilon Couzin & Karyn Kaplan: Pills Costs Pennies, Greed costs lives; 1st Hepatitis C Virus 
World Community Advisory Board Report, 
http://www.treatmentactiongroup.org/sites/g/files/g450272/f/201407/1st%20HCV%20World%20CAB
%20Report.pdf  (2015). 
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This thesis argues that the current international legal regime has a Eurocentric bias 
and perpetuates a cycle of underdevelopment, poverty and inequality, a consequence 
of a historically unjust international legal and economic system. Specifically, this 
argument is made through an analysis of trade law and its effects on access to 
pharmaceuticals, which in turn affects health care in developing countries. This 
examination is conducted through a historical analysis of the birth and rise of 
international law, specifically international economic and trade law, alongside the 
universalization of the capitalist economic system. This thesis builds on Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholarly writings and methodology in 
analyzing the international legal system to demonstrate the predatory nature of the 
system which legitimizes, reproduces, and sustains the plunder and subordination of 
the periphery states. This global system of relations has been facilitated and globalized 
by the rise and expansion of capitalism and modern international law, both of which 
have created and maintained inequality between center and periphery states7. 
Center/Core states are the developed, dominant capitalist states that have historically 
exploited periphery states for their raw materials in order to achieve capitalist 
expansions of their own. Periphery states are the “underdeveloped” states that lack 
strong economies and governments, and export raw materials to core countries, and as 
such are dependent on core countries. Specifically, the thesis examines the issues of 
inter-state inequality through examining the international legal regime that protects 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), exposing it as both a cause and an effect of an 
unjust universal system. The thesis focuses particularly on the drafting and application 
of the TRIPS agreement, its implications for the health of people in periphery states, 
and the broader consequences for development. It concludes by considering whether 
and how periphery states can work within such a system to overcome the continuous 
cycle of underdevelopment and poverty. 
Chapter I of this thesis provides the methodological and theoretical basis with which 
to assess the current global system, using TWAIL scholarship as the main theoretical 
 
7 Makau Mutua & Antony Anghie, What is TWAIL. 94 AMSIL, 31-40 (2000). 
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basis. Following this, the thesis provides a historical analysis of the rise of capitalism 
and modern international law, their prevalence and universalization, thus creating an 
unequal and unjust global economic order.  This includes an exploration of the rise of 
international economic law and postcolonial international legal reform in the area of 
economics, trade, and finance. Having set forth the ground upon which the 
international global order came to be and the extent of its bias towards center states, 
Chapter II then explores the historical progression of IPs. There is a two dimensional 
purpose to this chapter, first it shows that IPs were non-essential to the economic 
progression of center states. On the contrary because they were not properly applied it 
provided a leeway that allowed the industrial revolution in center states to develop 
such states without any barriers. The second purpose is that it shows that the 
transplanting mechanisms within periphery states (through colonization) and globally 
did not account for the needs or cultural difference of states. The end result is a global 
IP order that is biased towards center states and indifferent to the needs of periphery 
states. Chapter III examines the TRIPS agreement and how it protects the patent rights 
of the pharmaceutical industry. It considers the resulting effects on access to 
medicine, the spread of disease, and mortality levels in the developing world. The 
Chapter also considers the broader impact of TRIPS on development worldwide, 
considering whether the agreement prevents or exacerbates underdevelopment, 
poverty and inequality. It concludes with the argument that the TRIPS agreement, 
particularly when understood against the broader context of the development of global 
economic governance and the rise of IPRs, is a means for systemically perpetuating 
underdevelopment, poverty and inequality. This is exemplified by the pharmaceutical 
industry. The fifth and final Chapter considers terms upon which periphery states can 
work within such a bias system, bearing in mind that a complete alteration of the 
system or a decision to not work within the system in a globalized and connected 
world would be unrealistic. As such, the chapter explores the success of India in 
building a strong pharmaceutical industry through maneuvering the international 
system and especially using the loopholes within the new TRIPS regime. The Chapter 
also explores the case of Egypt, its success and failures, and what lessons it can take 
from the Indian case. The Chapter concludes by looking at alternative strategies for 
availability of pharmaceuticals in periphery states and considers future effects of 
TRIPS on the pharmaceutical industry.   
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I. Construction of the International Legal and Economic 
System 
The construction and universalization of international law were 
essential to the imperial expansion that subordinated non-European 
peoples and societies to European conquest and domination8 
A. Methodology  
The main question addressed in this thesis is: what is the effect of the Intellectual 
Property Rights Regime on the access to pharmaceuticals in developing countries? 
This question is examined using a qualitative research methodology through a holistic 
perspective of analysis of both the international legal system and the intellectual 
 
8 Mutua, supra note 7. 
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property rights regime and in turn its effect on the availability of pharmaceuticals in 
developing countries. The thesis uses the Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL) as both a theoretical and methodological base. The reason for choosing 
TWAIL is because its scholarship provides a critical non-Eurocentric analysis 
approach of the international legal system and presents alternative views on how 
international law can be understood. TWAIL presents a theoretical alternative to the 
common understanding of international law which demonstrates the bias against 
periphery states within the entire international legal system. This approach which 
deals with inequality between states is an essential foundation towards understanding 
the grounds upon which the IPR was built and demonstrates how the regime is a 
replica of a general cycle of global inequality. Further, TWAIL uses a 
multidisciplinary approach as a methodological basis that focuses on the historical 
progression of international law.  The thesis, uses the same methodology focusing on 
the historical rise and spread of both international law and the intellectual property 
rights regime exposing a bias against periphery states which is exemplified through 
the lack of availability of pharmaceuticals in such periphery states.  
1. Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
In analyzing the evolution of the current global legal system one finds that it 
corresponds with the economic and political needs of Western states. The evolution of 
the current global economic order and international law reflected the evolution of an 
international system that served and continues to serve the best interest of developed 
states and an economic system which is used a tool to do so. TWAIL provides both 
strong scholarship that moves away from the Eurocentric approach of analyzing the 
international global order. It uses a “historically aware methodology”9 to address and 
question the current international legal system.  TWAIL is not a monolithic theoretical 
school, rather it “provides a model for thinking about international law and institutions 
 
9 James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a 
Tentative Bibliography, 3 Trade Law and Development (2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1933766. 
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as a whole and for analyzing particular aspects or segments of our global order”.10 
TWAIL scholars address the issue of the unjust international legal system from a 
multidisciplinary approach to expose the bias of the global system, and in doing so 
attempts to formulate a theoretical basis to help reform the system. In that sense 
TWAIL has contributed in generating a new science of method and of legal studies. 
The main themes that TWAIL scholarship address are bringing the problem of 
colonialism to center stage arguing how the power dynamics of the colonial era persist 
to date. It provides a different historical account of the rise of the current global order 
thus demonstrating the biased nature of the global system. And finally, it also 
undermines the inherently Eurocentric nature of the system and proposes drastic 
changes in the global order. The significance of TWAIL to this thesis is three fold; 
first the methodology used in TWAIL scholarship with regards to using a historical 
account of the rise of international law, and specifically to this thesis of the IP laws, is 
replicated to move away from the Eurocentric approach which justifies the used of IP 
laws. Rather, much like what Anghie does in demonstrating the bias nature of the 
international legal system, through using a historical narrative, this is what the thesis 
does to show the bias nature of the IP regime. Second, much like Anghie and other 
TWAIL scholars who address the inequality of the system which was amplified 
through colonialism, the thesis demonstrates how colonialism was a mechanism of 
embedding IP laws in colonized states and using their control over such states to 
normalize the regime internationally before the decolonization of such states. Finally, 
the inherently bias nature of the system, described by Anghie in The Evolution of 
International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, along with writings by Verzijl 
and Lenin, are used as basis to exemplify how the unjust nature of the system extends 
to different parts of the global system, which include the Patent Regime.   
TWAIL scholarship focuses on understanding the interconnectedness of the 
world and examines how different laws and institutions are involved in the 
phenomena of global interdependence. TWAIL-ers thus address several issues related 
to society, politics, identity and economics between the periphery and core states.  
 
10 Chinedu Okafor Obiora, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): 
Theory, Methodology, or Both?, 10 International Community Law Review 371–378, 378 (2008). 
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Chimni focuses his research on the relationship between international public law and 
international economic law, and issues of global wealth and poverty. Rajagopal 
examines the link between development, human rights and international law through 
resistance, and Gathii among other things sketches notions of social issues from a 
historical context history and their relation to the creation of the rules of the WTO11. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the work Anthony Anghie, who explores the historical 
rise of modern international law contenting that its origins reveal its Eurocentric 
exploitive and biased nature. He further continues to argue that although the discipline 
has attempted to renew and reform itself, its imperialist nature has remained constant. 
B. Origins of International Law  
Examining the origins of international law, and providing a historical analysis 
of it provides evidentiary basis for the claim that international law and the global 
system is by nature biased and unjust. Anthony Anghie in several of his writings such 
as Imperialism, sovereignty, and the making of international law12, The Evolution of 
International Law: Colonial and postcolonial realities13 and Time Present and Time 
Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions14, examines the rise and 
evolution of international law and provides a strong account of how it is of purely 
Western origin and has been reformulated to a universal norm which serves the best 
interest of Western states. As JHW Verzjil states the body of international law “is the 
product of the conscious activity of the European mind” and is of “Western European 
 
11 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty, and the making of international law (2005). At 36 
12Id.         
13 Anthony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and postcolonial realities: Third 
World Quarterly: Vol 27, No 5, 740 (last visited Sep 10, 2016). 
14 Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions 
and The Third World, 32 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 243–290, 277 (2000). 
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Origin”. 15 The Eurocentric nature of International law is evidently clear in three 
manners; first the development of the system through its 3 principles schools of 
thought, second the development and evolution of the main doctrines of international 
law such as sovereignty and the relationship between colonialism and international 
law. 
The development of international law has been linked to three main schools of 
thought during different period of time, characterized by distinctive jurisprudence 
styles. The first, the Naturalist School of thought, which lasted from the 16th until the 
18th century and during which “it could be ascertained through the employment of 
reason, and this transcendent ‘natural’ law—which had religious origins—was 
binding on all states.”16 This “transcendent law” which was seen as global was 
Eurocentric in nature and none of the thinkers or scholars of such school of thought 
were non-European. The second, Positivism, which rose during the 19th century and 
has since prevailed as the dominant school of thought, is bound by the law produced 
by consent of sovereign states. This idea of the “sovereign state” and what it is to be a 
sovereign state along with the rules and doctrines that emerged from such states 
consent is all a European idea and had no non-European influence in it. Most 19th 
century international law focused on colonial problems; this is evident in the number 
of “special doctrines and norms had to be devised for the purpose of defining, 
identifying and placing the uncivilized and this is what the jurists of the period 
proceeded to do when listing among the modes of acquiring territory, conquest and 
cession by treaty.” 17 Finally, Pragmatism, which emerged to compliment the 
emergence of international institutions, and “provided the international system with a 
new set of technologies with which to address international problems”,18 emerged with 
 
15 JHW Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, 10 vols, Leiden: AW Sijthoff, 1968, 
Vol I, pp 435 – 436. 
16 Supra note 13. 
17 Id at 740-741. 
18 Id.  
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the rise of international institutions in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
to fill a necessary gap in the international relations sphere in Europe.19  
International law is the body of law which governs the relations between states 
and which is based on doctrines, principles and treaties between such states. A close 
look at such doctrines and principles shows that their development occurred in Europe 
based on the relations between European states and then extended globally.20  The 
corner stone of international law is the concept of sovereignty which emerged out of 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The concept of sovereignty is a purely European 
concept created as a means for European states to maintain its integrity and boarders 
without fear of outside intervention from other European States. However, the 
definition of sovereignty, which entailed requirements such as ruling over a controlled 
territory with “civilized” people, was then used as a means of legitimizing 
colonization. This legitimization of colonization was done through justifying the 
exclusion non-European countries from the definition of sovereign states, since the 
criteria of controlled territory and civilized was based on European standards, 
inapplicable to most of the rest of the World.21 Vitoria, one of the founders member of 
modern international law in his jurisprudential account of the Spanish conquest of the 
“Indians”, as the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas were then known, 
demonstrates the bias and exclusionary aspect of international law through the 
sovereignty doctrine. Vitoria justified the conquest of the Indies, as a result of their 
failure to show “sovereignty” over their territories as sovereignty was understood in 
Europe. And as a result, this justified the Spanish conquest of Indian territories to 
further the economic and trade interests of Spain.22 This was to be used a mechanism 
for the conquest of non-European people by justifying the act of war against them. 
The result of this was the “disenfranchised and subordinated non-European peoples”23 
 
19 Id.  
20Id at 740. 
21  Anghie, supra note 13, at 13.  
22 Id. at 13. 
23 Anghie, supra note 13, at 35. 
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through colonization and through justifying this under international law. This was 
done through the creating a cultural difference in the “new international law” by 
crafting a category of civilized and non-civilized states and “asserted that international 
law applied only to the sovereign states which compromised of the civilized family of 
nations.24 Anghie’s analysis of Vitoria’s work in Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
making of International Law25 is threefold.  First, it established the premise that 
international as a legal framework has been constructed to serve the needs of 
European/Core states and to legally justify the acts taken unjustly against other 
nations.  Second, international legal doctrines, some of which stand strong as building 
blocks of international law today, like the sovereignty doctrine, are at its core biased 
towards the political and economic needs of core states. Third, it demonstrated 
“several crucial and enduring aspects of the relationship between colonialism and 
international law” at heart of which is the centrality of commerce to colonialism and 
in parallel to international law. 26 
 The European imperialist project expanded from the Spanish conquest of New 
Americas to Asia and Africa. It reached its peak in the 19th century, the century most 
known as the colonization period. Its significance lies in how it set forth basic notions 
and concepts what is to become today’s international law. Most 19th century 
international law focused on colonial problems; this is evident in the number of 
“special doctrines and norms had to be devised for the purpose of defining, identifying 
and placing the uncivilized” and this is what the jurists of the period proceeded to do 
when listing among the modes of acquiring territory, conquest and cession by treaty.27  
An example is the doctrine of terra nullius, which allowed states allowed the legal 
conquests of uninhabited lands. It also legalized the conquest of lands inhabited by 
people “regarded as inferior or backwards”, in other words uncivilized from the 
 
24 Id.at 35. 
25 Id.at 35. 
26 Anghie, supra note 14, at 744. 
27 Anghie, supra note 13, at 36. 
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European perspective.28 Clearly, the colonial period was also significant in imposing 
European law in conquered territories and the universalization of that European law, 
which was purely based on European imperialistic needs. The significant of this on 
modern international law is threefold; first it created an international law which was 
non inclusive during a period in which the development of international law was the 
most creative.  Second, doctrines from this century, which clearly reflected the 
imperialist bias of European states, still stand to this day as foundation of international 
law. Third, the ultimate effect of this is establishing European standards as the 
ultimate goal which non-European states aim to reach. Achieving sovereignty thus 
becomes a form of alienation and non-empowerment and submission to alien 
standards, which is evident in the decolonization period.29 
Decolonization did not come about as a sudden movement rather it was a series of 
global events heightened by the first and second world wars that eventually lead to 
decolonization. There were several international factors that aided in the rise of 
national movements within colonies against the colonizers that began in the 1900s. 
Most prominent of those factors were: President Woodrow Wilson advocating of the 
right of self-determination, the rise of Pan-Islam and the Russian revolution30.  The 
effect was the rise of demonstrations and sabotage against colonizers during the 
period of 1910 until the beginning of the first World War in colonies such as India and 
Egypt, leading to a decrease in the power of the colonizers. This decrease in power 
was demonstrated for example by the resignation of the agent and consul general of 
Egypt, Lord Cromer.31 This like many other incidents signaled the end a period of  
 
28 Id.at 59. 
29 Id. at 108. 
30 Id.  
31 Roger Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (2004). 
In 1879, Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, was assigned as as the British controller 
general in Egypt, the control which reviewed the Finances of Egypt following its Bankruptcy 
in 1876., Later in 1883, Lord Cromer became the agent and consul general in Egypt, under 
which he was in charge of all of Egypt’s finances, economic development and governance.  
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uncontested rule especially in British and French colonies32. The decolonization 
movement was only cemented by the events of the First and Second World Wars. The 
wars had a two-fold impact on the decolonization movement. First, both wars caused a 
movement of ideas within lesser social classes as a result of their recruitment into 
military service. Those coming from uneducated backgrounds were fed slogans of 
freedom by the educated elite33. Second, during both wars political concessions and 
reforms had to be given to colonies in return for “recruitment and mobilization of 
colonial troops,” to help out during the wars, making it possible for national 
movements to make demands from the colonizers. During WWI, this helped national 
movement gain more ground, force concessions, declare most colonies protectorates 
especially later after the end of the war under the Mandate system, and set new 
reforms that laid down ground work for future regulations. During WWII “chief 
colonial powers suffered disastrous setbacks34” and thus they had to promise future 
emancipation eventually leading to decolonization35.   
Because of the weakening position of colonies following WWI, and the 
concessions to colonies that needed to be given at the time, a new approach towards 
dealing with the colonies needed to be created. This was done by creating the Mandate 
System within the League of Nations, which helped in applying the promised 
concession and justifying a lesser form of colonialism within the context of 
international law. Under the Provision of the League of Nations, which was only made 
of Victories states of WWI, the Mandate system aimed to “create sovereignty and to 
produce functioning nation-states”36 in mandated territories. Lord Lugard, a prominent 
British supporter of colonization who saw colonies as important sources of raw 
 
32 Id. at 19. 
33 Id. at 20. 
34 Id. at 23-26. 
35 Id. at 27. 
36Anghie, supra note 14, at 36. 
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materials and “markets for metropolitan cities”, was one of the founding member of 
the Permanent Mandate Commission. And so, one of the main purposes of the 
Mandate system is “developing” the “backward” mandated states by influencing the 
day to day administration of such countries to ensure the wellbeing and 
“development” of such states.37 The expansion of commerce and commercial laws at 
the time were thus mechanisms under this system guided by colonial principles. It also 
clearly demonstrates the bias of the international legal system. More importantly, it 
had an important effect on the neo-colonial global order, which was setting for the 
ground to the move from a formal political to an informal economic colonialism, 
which was cemented following WWII. Thus, shifting the global focus and the focus of 
international law into areas of economics, commerce and trade. And that is evident not 
only in the increasing numbers of treaties in trade, but also in the number of 
institutions that deal with it. The significance of the Mandate system in forming the 
current legal and global order traces to how it set up the standards, methodology, 
norms and regulations upon which the global system, including international 
institutions, were built on afterward. This imperialist system was created through 
bringing about a new science of systems control through new science of management 
and administration relying of models of legitimacy. It also produced what was called 
the ‘science of development’ which provided the legitimating foundation of 
contemporary development institutions.38 This ‘science of development’, which is a 
product of the Mandate system, produced a scientific account of causes of 
‘underdevelopment’ in non-European states, based on the collection of data from 
mandated states and comparing it to European standards. The results of which was 
setting the blame on the economic, social and political structure of periphery states, 
and generating a universal idea based on the structure of the core states. This became 
a mechanism of neo-colonial control following WWII and the decolonization of 
previously colonized states, whereby institutions that came to be afterwards like the 
IMF and World Bank set economic political and legal policies based on the structure 
and needs of core states and justifying it under the pretense of development, as per 
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mechanisms and arguments laid down through the Mandate system39. 
With the end of the Second World War, the fall of the League of Nations, and 
creation of the United Nations, the Mandate system came to an end. The international 
system witnessed the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions along with the exponential growth of a number of international 
institutions, some of which with the sole aim of aiding development of periphery 
states. The Bretton Woods institutions, The IMF and World Bank, became the leading 
actors in pushing and promoting policies of economic and political change, for what 
they promoted as developmental purposes. However, the entire system had already 
been built to forcefully integrate newly independent states into an already biased 
international system. For example, the United Nations, which became central to 
maintaining international order and applying international law, was based 
international legal concepts, agreements and treaties between states that already were 
biased in nature, and became a means of manipulation and control for the benefit of 
core states. A clear example was that newly independent states had to be recognized 
by member states, all of which at its establishment were core states, as sovereign 
states to be allowed into the UN. And in accepting such a requirement states then by 
default accepted the already existing international legal order, which as shown was 
based on the needs and benefits of core states. And thus in doing so, forcing periphery 
states to accept the status quo. This has become a manner to manage and control 
periphery states to benefit European countries first through the mandate system and 
now through IFIs, the UN and other institutions; an elaborate way in which colonial 
relations are reproduced. 40 
Consequently, as Anghie argues International law continues to reproduce the 
imperialist structures that have existed since the birth of modern international law. 
“Colonial origins of the discipline are re-enacted whenever the discipline attempts to 
renew itself, reform itself.” Doctrines created to further colonialism which stand today 
are difficult to reform; thus new international law doctrines somehow reproduced the 
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structure of the imperialist ‘civilizing mission’.41 Today imperialism is legitimized 
through the new language of development, economic reform and liberalization 
policies. All of which serve the capitalist interest of Western states.  
C. The Rise and Expansion of Capitalism  
Having discussed the rise of modern international law and argued not only that 
it is imperialistic and bias in nature, but also the centrality of commerce and trade to 
it, it is important to discuss the rise and expansion of capitalism and how it too 
furthered and continues to primarily focus of the imperialistic needs of Western states. 
The rise and expansion of capitalism can be historically traced back to four significant 
phases; The Mercantilist phase, the Colonial period, the postcolonial period and the 
post-imperialist phase. Each of these phases as will be briefly discussed, aided in the 
dominance of Western states globally, and had a regressive effect on periphery states, 
that has continued to date.  
During the Mercantilist period, from 1500-1800, Europe underwent the biggest 
phase of trade expansion into Asia, Africa and South America. European merchants 
conquered shores and trade routes in search for gold, spices and slaves. Trade 
relations between European and non-Europeans was unequal and unfair, where 
Europeans basically looted and plundered non-European territories for their raw 
materials and transferred such economic surplus back to Europe. This economic 
surplus aided dramatically in paying for the industrial revolution by paying for the 
technological and industrial advances in Europe. The effect of this period was 
threefold; first the birth of industrialization and the development of capitalism in 
Europe, the regression of non-European states development because of the dominate 
Europe presence in all markets, and the creation of production surplus, especially after 
the industrial revolution.42 This production surplus and the need to acquire more raw 
material as a result of industrialization led to the need for expansion and dominance of 
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markets globally, which eventually after the early 1800s lead to the annexation of 
non-European territories through colonial policy.   
Colonialist expansion led to a division of the world with a center and a 
periphery; the center states were in control of the global economy and politics and the 
periphery economically and politically dependent.43  The colonial era between 1880-
1945 furthered the already segmented world, and capitalism with its new forms of 
production and new technologies aided in globalizing this. The colonialist expansion, 
following the industrial period, and the changes in modes of production and growing 
role of technology caused an unequal division of labor between core and periphery 
states that established an unequal global economic division that has since then lasted. 
For example, while colonies were specialized in producing agricultural goods and thus 
developing specialized labor in agricultural production, Europeans invested within 
their own countries and colonies in tertiary and industrial sectors such as banking and 
trade railways and ports, and the production of manufactured goods.44 This meant that 
while core states industrialized in different sectors and diversified their economies, 
periphery states remained specialized, with no spark to spur industrialization, keeping 
them dependent on exporting raw materials. This resulted in the dependency of such 
periphery states on core states to acquire produced goods. To this end colonized states, 
that Amin refers to as periphery states, witnessed an era of “blocked development”, 
while Europe underwent extreme modernization and development.45  The result was 
the creation of two different global social systems, whereby the center produced 
profitable manufactured goods, and the periphery based their economies on raw 
materials, a form of unproduced goods which have a lower trade value in the 
international system. This in itself was a representation of the economic reality of the 
dominance of core states.  Such conditions were the building blocks of the new 
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capitalist world order and the era under which new international economics was 
born.46 
 The imposed division of resources, labor and technology during the colonial 
period laid the foundations for “continued economic control and domination over 
colonial resources even in the absence of direct political over lordship and 
administration”.47 Capitalist markets and market institutions were established and set 
in the hands of Western multinational companies, long term concessions granted of 
such colonies to subsidiaries of those multinationals firms, and  agriculture and 
production of exported crops given to foreign plantation owners. Thus preparing the 
domestic and international economies into a neo-colonial period of continued Western 
control. Neo-colonial control as Hoogvelt describes was recognized mainly in the 
continued” resource bondage” and trade status between Western and non-Western 
countries. 48  With independence in sight, another strategy taken by colonial states was 
the shift of metropolitan states from production of consumer goods to the production 
of producer goods, and shifting consumer goods into controlled areas of previous 
colonies. This also created a new kind of dependency and source of surplus extraction 
through browed or rented technologies that were now needed in newly colonized 
states from the West, creating a continued dependency with new forms of capitalism 
taking place49.  This along with international institution’s, doctrines and treaties 
embedded colonial relations and solidified it in continued control over the world’s 
economy  
This new international economic system was reflected in the already biased 
international legal system. The Internationalization of Intellectual Property Rights 
were used as another mechanism to continue the bias within the international. One 
such example of this biased international system. This internationalization was 
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implementation initially through the ratification of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property which was adopted in 1883 and the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic works adopted in 1886. The 
Paris and Berne conventions were created as a mechanism to deal with the expanding 
needs of colonizing states regarding the protection of patented material, and to 
globalize it to their colonies. Patent law, which was first internationalized through the 
Paris Convention, was signed only by 11 countries, most of which were core 
countries. The rise of patent law can be genealogically traced to the 13th century 
English inventors patent law, after which Europe witnessed expansion of different 
forms of patent.  Most prominent and influential of such laws was the Republic of 
Venice Patent Act. From the 15th century onwards the wave of patent laws saw 
periods of advancement as well as periods of complete silence on the issue until the 
Industrial Revolution when the situation changed drastically. With the constant 
growth in innovation during the industrial period, Western countries realized the need 
to institute patency law. They needed it to protect their own industries from 
competition with one another, as well as to maintain an upper hand over colonized 
states by preventing them from copying western technology. The globalization of 
patency was then achieved through forcing the application of patency laws within 
colonies and legitimizing them through international conventions drafted by core 
states such as the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886.50 
D. The Global Order in The 20th Century 
Although the 20th century was the century of decolonization and creation of 
independent previously colonized states, it was also the century that brought about 
new players onto the global scene that would embed imperialistic and dominant 
relations between developed and underdeveloped states. These players were 
international institutions dominated by Western states who used international law, 
through doctrines and agreements previously created and new ones created by them to 
maintain control over underdeveloped states. The United Nations serves as perfect 
example of how this was done. Although the UN Charter Article 2(1) states that “The 
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Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”51 
the reality is that the organization structure reflects otherwise. The UN Security 
Council , which has much of the power of taking action and decision-making within 
the UN is controlled by 5 permanent members, all of which with the exception of 
China, are western/core states. This in itself reflects the reproduced imperialistic 
structure of the 18th and 19th century. Second, within the new global system was the 
creation of transnational industries on a global scale. 
Another example of embedding the relationship between developed and 
underdeveloped states both through international law and through institutionalization 
was embedding capitalist liberalism. This was done through several institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank. More prominently, and what this thesis focuses on 
was through the creation of the WTO and its agreements. The Uruguay GATT rounds 
of 1994 produced the Trade–Related Investment Measures agreement (TRIMS) and 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (TRIPS). Both 
agreements severely circumscribed the sovereign rights of all member states to 
regulate investment and trade in pursuit of “developmental” needs. TRIMS phased out 
previously perceived protocols of development strategies like local content 
requirements in production, domestic sales requirements, balancing sales requirements 
and exchange restrictions. TRIPS strengthened property rights of foreign investment, 
extended patent protection, which in most cases belong to western multinational 
companies. The result is of this patenting process is that developing countries end up 
suffering huge drawbacks and regression in several sectors, including the 
pharmaceutical sector for example, and in turn this affected their development as will 
be discussed in upcoming sections of the thesis. 
 
II. The Genealogy of IPRs 
Since it is rooted in a contradiction, there can be no such thing as an 
ideally beneficial patent system and it is bound to produce negative 
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results in particular instances, impeding progress unnecessarily even if 
its general effect is favorable on balance.52   
As discussed in Chapter II the international legal and economic system is 
characterized by its biased imperialist nature favoring center states over periphery 
states. The rise and expansion of capitalism was the fuel that caused an expansion of 
an economic order based on private ownership. The expansion of private ownership 
rights alongside the emergence of new forms of technology and wide spread need for 
innovation through the spread of information led to the evolution and globalization of 
patent and copyrights laws. This chapter explores the nature of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs), and through a historical discussion argues that European economic 
progress before, during and following the industrial revolution occurred despite not 
because of the existence of IPRs. The chapter argues that, much like the rest of 
international law, non-European states has no input in the creation and evolutions of 
IPRs, and it was a purely European creation. Also, much like the method upon which 
international law came to be in that it was forced upon periphery states, IPRs were 
transplanted in colonized states based on European standards. The result is a now 
globalized IPR legal system, cemented through the TRIPs agreement, that is biased 
against periphery states.  
A. Private Ownership and The Rise of Intellectual Property Rights 
For centuries, the concept of private ownership has been associated with the 
ownership of tangible objects like land. The right of private ownership has existed in 
many forms over in history. It has progressed from the communal ownership of land, 
to the right of an individual to own land, along with other tangible pieces of property 
like cattle. However, it was only in the Middle Ages that European countries started to 
acknowledge the need for property rights to take legal form. During this time, rulers 
gave out concessions to others purportedly giving then control of land, but the land in 
reality still belonged to the king. It was only later towards the end of the medieval 
period and the beginning of the Enlightenment that the idea of land ownership took 
root.  It is this idea of private ownership that serves as the basis of the right for 
 
52 Joan Robinson, The Accumulation of Capital, 1956.  
 22 
Intellectual Property (IP).53 Unlike the traditional right of private property, which 
dealt with tangible objects, IPs are rights to intangible objects that result from one’s 
own intellect, creativity, ideas and invention. IPs thus encompasses an array of forms 
such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, and industrial designs, that cut cross several 
fields from art and different technological sectors to medical know-how and 
production. IPs grant a limited type of monopoly over such creations with specific 
conditions for a certain period of time. The reason for granting IPs as presented by its 
proponents it to allow innovators ideas, products and technologies to be 
“compensated”.54   
The history of IP passed through three distinct phases until it reached the point 
of being the international law concept it is today. The first phase was the emergence 
of IP in medieval Europe. Although IPs, especially in the field of copyright, emerged 
as legal rights, the system was very weak legally and administratively. In spite of 
these weaknesses, the importance of this period lies in the actual codification of the 
concept in core states as a result of their desire to protect artistic innovation. Notably, 
until the era of colonialism, periphery states were not involved in either the 
development or implementation of IP regimes. The second phase is the 
internationalization of IPs, whereby multilateral agreements started emerging as a 
means to protect IPs and set standards between states as to what the conditions for 
protection between signatory states were.  During this period, the involvement of 
periphery states was minimal. The third phase, which set the stage for the current 
global IP system, originated with the establishment of the WTO and the adoption of 
TRIPS.55  
The Middle Ages witnessed the first law related to intellectual property rights. 
Much like the method by which rulers granted property rights to people in their favor, 
kings, bishops and other political figures hired engineers and skilled workers to 
conduct technology intensive manufacturing for military and building cathedrals.  
Those inventors were granted contracts to keep their invention secret, and were 
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rewarded for doing so. Out of such practices aimed at monopolizing the market and 
deterring invention in other states did the first institutional practice of IP protection 
grow.56 An example is the 15th century Venetian patent law, which granted patent 
rights in the form of a “monopoly awarded for the possession of locally novel craft 
knowledge or for the invention of new devices.”57 The Venetian Patent System aimed 
at creating an incentive system within its borders but also at protecting its secrets from 
moving outside them. Its granting was also based on the usefulness of the invention 
with a standard duration of 10 years.58 Thus throughout the 15th and 16th centuries 
patents were basically forms of monopolies limited to novel machines and processes, 
and in some cases on the basis of authorship or possession of the knowledge of certain 
machines. While it was argued that it was a way of forwarding economic 
development, the reality was that it had a two-fold purpose. First, it was a means for 
insuring that such innovations remained within their birthplaces to advance their 
economic status. Second it was granted to powerful rich men, as privileges on the 
basis of court favors.59 During the period prior to the Industrial Revolution, only the 
crème de la crème of society were able to have access to patent rights due to their high 
cost and lengthy process. Patent rights prior to the industrial revolution were a 
mechanism of monopoly and domination for the influential and powerful in European 
states.   
It was during the industrial period that a greater focus on IPs began to emerge, 
arguably to put in motion economic growth. With the increased efforts of several 
European countries, especially Britain and France, to produce and implement IP laws, 
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the number of registered patented inventions grew. Many historians, especially 
proponents of IPRs, argue that the growth of patented inventions during the industrial 
era is an indicator of the relationship between patent rights accumulation and 
economic development60. Such proponents associated protection of industrial 
technology with economic growth. However, as Joel Mokyr argues, the increasing 
number of patent registrations in Britain, for example, was not in fact related to the 
economic development that was taking place.61 Rather it was because of the decreased 
cost of registration of patents and the growing idea of non-cooperative 
competitiveness: a “race to the bottom” process whereby patents registered 
preemptively to prevent others from registering similar ideas.  
In other words, because patent laws were imperfect at the time, and lacked 
boundaries that they have today, as the costs of patenting decreased the registration of 
patent rights increased as means of blocking competition from creating new 
inventions. The effect was in actuality decreased development and growth, in the 
same way that patents in medieval times were initially designed to block innovation 
and growth. Now with the process simpler and cheaper, the blockage spread further. 
Additionally, many scientists with scientific innovations during that period did not 
acquire patent rights over their inventions because they saw science as an end in itself 
not a means to a fortune.62  Moreover, the experience of most European countries 
seems to lend little support to the central role of patents in spurring industrial 
innovation. The most striking case is the Netherlands, which, despite its high degree 
of economic development in the seventeenth century, did not figure prominently in the 
Industrial Revolution. Yet it had a patent system established in the sixteenth century.63  
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An examination of patent law during the industrial period shows that the 
introduction of patent rights did not fuel economic and technological development, 
rather it held it back. One prominent example is James Watt’s patent right over the 
steam engine. In 1764, after producing a new model of the steam engine with the help 
of Matthew Boulton, he was able to hold the patent for it until 1800.64 During this 
period, while having a monopoly over it, Watt did not try to improve on it or actually 
produce many of them because of its high price; he, rather, gained money by receiving 
royalties from the right of patency over it. After the expiration of the patent right there 
was “an explosion in the production and efficiency of engines”,65 produced by 
inventors who improved on Watt’s inventions. Steam power later became the driving 
force of the Industrial Revolution because of modifications to the engine that drove 
the Industrial Revolution into full force in the years following the expiration of this 
patent. This development was blocked for almost 30 years by Watt’s hold of the 
patent. 66  
While it is undeniable that there was growth in the patent system during the 
industrial period, “there is ample evidence that the patent system did not operate as 
effectively or as perfectly”67 as popularly believed. The patent movement had a 
number of administrative weaknesses: procedures were cumbersome; there were 
plenty of opportunities for cheating; the cost of patenting was very high and “the 
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poorly defined and uncertain nature of the law down to the 1830s tended to erode the 
value of patent property and consequently tended to shift the terms of trade against the 
inventor”.68 As such, patents actually tended to reduce the expected rate of return for 
the inventor, and they saw it as being of little value. Moreover, court systems were 
biased against patent holders in most cases as they saw it as a form of monopoly. 
Thus, as Dutton argues, the system at the time was imperfect, but it was this 
imperfection that made it ideal. As Dutton argues, that “which effectively protects 
inventors in every sense will slow down the rate of innovation and imitation”,69 and 
thus slow down technological change70. This flawed system, along with the fact that 
such laws only applied domestically since no multilateral agreements had been signed 
between European states, made the system ineffective. The result was the flow of 
information and technology between European states during that period, which 
resulted in increased development because of the diffusion of knowledge, information 
and technological know-how. It was said that, when it came to industrial designs and 
know-how, Germans copied from the British, Americans copied from the British and 
Germans; and the Japanese copied from everyone.71  
Up until the 20th century, most European states had imperfect systems of 
patenting.  Such systems mostly operated within their own borders, but some also 
expanded to operate throughout Europe through trade agreements. The risk was the 
growing capacity of industrialization and capitalism to transfer technology outside the 
European region. Europe had to act to prevent that, and the solution was through 
legalizing patency in colonized areas. 
B.  The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Transplanting Patent Law During The Colonial Era    
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European states soon realized that there was a need to globalize patent and 
copyrights law to expand their control over their inventions and to prevent the reverse 
engineering of their products and knowledge that came with it. Therefore, starting in 
the early 19th century, colonial powers like France and Britain introduced copyright 
law in all of their colonies and mandates.  By 1864, 17 British colonies had adopted 
patent laws, most of which did so by transplanting British patent law.72 Similarly 
France also transplanted its patent law in its colonies. With these moves came the 
creation of conventions and treaties that protected patency like the Paris Convention 
of 188373 and Berne Convention of 188674. Although such conventions were ratified 
by European states with very little participation from developing states, they stated 
that “any country may declare in its instrument of ratification or accession … that this 
convention shall be application to all or part to those territories… for the external 
relations of which it is responsible”75. As Olwan states, “IP law was not merely an 
incidental part of the colonial legal apparatus, but a central technique in the 
commercial superiority sought by the European powers in their interaction with each 
other in regions beyond Europe”76. This was further cemented through 
internationalizing IP laws through international conventions and agreements, which 
colonies had to abide by77, thus demonstrating Anghie argument of the purely 
 
72 Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property: The Global Spread of a Legal Concept (2013). 
73 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, adopted 20 March, 1883, U.N.T.S. 
221 
74 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works S. Treaty, adopted 9 
September, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Peukert, supra note 72.  
 28 
Eurocentric nature of international law which was globalized to continuously provide 
for the needs of European states.   
1. The Paris Convention of 1883 
The Paris Convention was the first multilateral treaty on IP, and is thus seen as one of 
the two building main blocks that have led to the globalization of the IP regime78. The 
Paris Convention was drafted after various conferences were held between 1873 to 
1882, and is considered one of the foremost international treaties with regard to the 
protection of industrial property. Its main aim is the protection of patent, trademarks, 
industrial designs, utility models, trade names, geographical indication, and repression 
of unfair competition, while at the same time facilitating more trade. The vast majority 
of developed countries adopted the treaty and transplanted it into their own domestic 
laws and the laws of their colonies as a means of “civilizing” those countries. Article 
2 of the convention facilitated the transplanting process through the “colonial clause,” 
which obligated the colonized to adopt the Paris Convention as they were part of the 
colonial power that had adopted the Convention and were under its jurisdictional 
powers79. The process ignored the various developmental stages, and the social and 
cultural differences between developed and developing countries. This one-size-fits-
all ideology resulted in hampering rather than aiding the developmental process in 
colonized regions.80 
In realizing that the international patent system was imbalanced in favor of 
core states, periphery states attempted to amend the Paris Convention to protect their 
own interests and meet local conditions. The main proponent of this was Brazil, a 
signatory to the Convention, who first brought up the issues to the UN in 1961. Brazil 
contended that the IP system was a barrier to economic development and requested an 
investigation into its effect in underdeveloped countries. The report, published in 
1964, saw no reason for revising the system itself, but rather on working on reforming 
the internal institutions of periphery states. The report saw that the lack of strong 
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governance in periphery states caused ineffective administration, court systems and 
forms of monitoring, which lead to the lack of proper application of IP laws. Thus, the 
report attributed the lack of developmental progress to weak internal governance 
rather than a result of the nature of IP laws or its system. In spite of this conclusion, 
and after considerable pressure from developing nations in 1970, the UN General 
Assembly Resolution entitled the International Development Strategy for the Second 
UN Development Decade recommended a revision of the IP system. Although the 
Convention was amended in 1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 1958, 1967, and 1979, it was 
unsuccessful in working towards the benefit of developing countries and later attempts 
to change it were blocked by core states, especially the US.81 
 
 
 
2. The Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works  
The Berne Convention, the second cornerstone of the international IP regime, focused 
on the protection of literary and artistic work82. Thus, its main concern was copyright. 
The Convention was drafted in 1886 and went into effect in 1887 with ten states 
signing on, only two of which were developing countries, Tunisia and Haiti, clearly 
demonstrating that there was almost no representation of the ideologies or policies of 
periphery states. The Convention, much like the Paris Convention, had a colonial 
clause, Article 19, which extended the obligations of the Convention to colonized 
states.  Much like the Paris Convention, following their independence, periphery 
states were not happy with the copyright system and argued that it needed revision to 
address the interests and conditions of their states. They proposed that the Convention 
have “concessions for their benefit and a system of reservations that they could use 
when needed.”83 After years of debate, and politicization of the Berne Convention, the 
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status of the Convention as a whole was endangered. In 1971, an Appendix on Special 
Provisions Regarding Developing Countries allowing developing countries “non-
transferable licenses to its nationals, for the translation or reproduction of foreign 
owned-copyright works for education or research purposes.”84  This appendix allowed 
periphery states to copy any copyrighted material if it was used to further research in 
certain areas or for educational use, to enable periphery states a greater chance of 
development. However, this process was not facilitated easily. Getting such an 
exception was a lengthy and costly process for developing countries.85  
 
C. The Transplanting of IPs in Periphery states  
In analyzing the transplanting experience of IPs on periphery states, we find that 
several TWAIL scholars like Gathii and  Anghie argue that in the postcolonial 
realities IPS was and is a method of domination and control that did not fuel economic 
development. Rather is demonstrated a repetitive cycle of colonial relations.  The 
Indian case serves as a very good example.  
British influence in India started in 1600 with Queen Elizabeth I chartering the 
Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies, 
commonly known as ‘The Company’ or ‘The East India Company’. It laid the 
foundation for British rule in India, until the British Crown directly took over control 
of India in 1858, following a massive revolt against the Company,86 After this, a 
patent law was introduced to “grant certain exclusive privileges to inventors for a 
period of fourteen years”, and this required prior sanction by the Crown or its 
representative: “Thus, the 1856 Act was repealed when the Indian Legislative Council 
passed Act IX of 1857; Act IX was followed by a new law enacted in 1859 that 
granted inventors the exclusive privilege to make, use, and sell their invention in 
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India.”87 The purpose of this was to allow the British patent holders to gain control 
over Indian markets. The law had huge restrictions on the importation of technologies 
and inventions, leading technology to become “highly complex and prohibitively 
expensive”. Over the following decades under British colonization, patent laws 
continued to be developed and refined.  In 1872, the Patents and Designs Protection 
Act was enacted, followed by the Protection of Inventions Act in 1883.88 In 1911 the 
Invention and Design act came into force, with two important consequences resulting 
from it. First, it consolidation the Patents and Designs Protection Act and the 
Protection of Inventions Act. Second, it increased patent protection period to 16 years. 
This Act continued to govern India until after India’s independence in 1947, when it 
was finally repealed by the Patent Act of 1970. All of the various versions of the Act 
“allowed for product patents in all fields of technology, including pharmaceuticals.”89  
The effect of the British transplant and the evolution of the Patent Act in India was 
massive, and it weakened India’s industries. One such industry was the 
pharmaceutical industry. The 1911 Act, for example, prevented the manufacturing of 
reverse engineered drugs owned by foreign drug manufacturers that held patent rights, 
even after India gained independence.90 This included most life-saving drugs such as 
insulin, streptomycin, and penicillin. Thus, they were imported at high prices, and 
outside the reach of most of the Indian population. The result was one of the largest 
populations in the world gaining independence with weak industries, a sick and poor 
population, and a hindrance to development.  It was only after the amendment of the 
Patent Act that Indian industry developed, especially its pharmaceutical industry.  
As discussed, imperial powers approached the issue of IP law in colonies in a 
manner that advanced and protected the interests of empire. The application of IP laws 
in colonies using a one-size-fit-all methodology that was based on the economic, 
social and political interests of imperial powers was a setback for the development of 
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the Third World, and aided in creating a globally divided system that is unequal and 
biased.  
D. The Debate on IPRs 
The historical narrative so far, detailing the emergence transplanting and globalization 
of IPs, argues that IPs were not drivers of innovation in Europe or the rest of the 
world. Contrary to common perception, IPs were mechanisms of monopoly and 
control by the elite in core states to generate profit and maintain control by very few 
in the West. Capitalism was the mechanism for doing so, and colonial policies along 
with IP laws were the tools.  Following decolonization, Western states had reached a 
high level of industrialization and technology was becoming an important factor in 
capitalism. The result was a push by the United States and European countries for the 
globalization of the IP regime, to maintain their hegemonic power through 
monopolizing knowledge and technology.  
During the industrial period, proponents of patent law had four main rationales 
for justifying patent protection. The first was the natural-law thesis, which asserts that 
individuals have a natural right to own their own ideas.91 If a patent holder is not 
compensated it is a form of theft and thus government intervention is needed to 
protect such a right. This also means that inventors invent more since their own ideas 
are protected. This is like the government’s protection of private property, arguing 
that investments in property increase, because investors feel safe and protected. In the 
same way, the government should protect inventions and ideas, since intellectual 
property is as much a natural right as property, and protection will allow inventors to 
feel free enough to innovate and create.  
 The problem is that patenting inventions infringes on the public right of 
society, which is an indirect contributor to such inventions. Hindmarch argued that 
“no inventor can, in fact, have any natural right to prevent any other person from 
making and using the same or similar invention.”92 For Hindmarch, an invention is a 
result of several factors that fosters one’s own creative an innovative thinking; such 
 
91 Olwan, supra note 53. 
92 Dutton Supra note 86. 
 33 
factors include societal motivation, education, and governmental support. Without 
such factors, this invention could not exist. It is no one’s right to have a monopoly 
over thoughts and ideas that the public have, in various ways, aided in creating.93 
 The second argument was the reward-by-monopoly argument, which is still 
widely used to justify patent laws. The basis of this notion was that the reward to the 
inventor should be according to the usefulness of the invention. Since such a reward 
cannot be guaranteed purely by market forces, the state should intervene to guarantee 
it temporarily. By doing so, inventors are more inclined to invent since their reward 
for their ingenuity and effort is protected.94 Without such rights, competitors would 
reduce their prices, and inventive output would decrease. Moreover, the quality of the 
invention would be subject to market forces; that is, if the product was not good, it 
would not be profitable. Consequently, this does not harm the market, rather it 
benefits it.   
The problem with this argument is that contradicts the primary assumption and 
basis of the global economic order based on the capitalist system. The assumption is 
that market forces should be the only forces setting demand, supply, and thus the price 
of products. Thus, this contradicts the ideas that there should be an outside element, 
through law, that needs to adjust the market for the benefit of inventors.  
 Inventions relying on a patented idea, product or process would have to pay 
royalties, amounting to considerable sums of money to use the patent right. In most 
cases, other inventors will not want to pay the royalty, and thus will have to wait until 
the expiration of the royalty before developing patented ideas. The result is that, if 
royalties are paid, the patent holder profits; and because most people will not want to 
pay them new inventions that could override the invention of the patent holder are 
delayed, and the patent holder continues to benefit from the right over the invention 
for the period of time the law guarantees. Thus, patenting holds back innovation 
instead of spurring it on. 
The final argument is the exchange for secrets proposition, which is concerned 
with the dissemination of information. The argument proposed is that protecting the 
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information regarding such an invention would to protect the interests of the inventor. 
The result is an increased flow of information since the inventor/investor is 
guaranteed profits by selling such information. He also has a motive for allowing the 
propagation of information and product processes.95 
On the other hand, it is argued that the monopoly over royalties, and their 
expense, hinders innovation. In areas such as pharmaceuticals, which rely on building 
new ideas on the success of old ones, innovation would remain at a standstill since 
methodologies and processes would have to wait until the expiration of the patent 
right unless vast royalties could be paid.96  
Today, proponents of the IP regime argue that the system promotes 
investments in knowledge creation and business innovation by creating exclusive 
rights to sell technology, goods and services. This motivates investors to invest more 
since the risks of return of investment in research and development, is guaranteed 
through patency rights. Without such protections, investors are less inclined to spend 
money on research and development.97 In a related argument, it is claimed that with 
such protection there is also an increase in the amount of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) because of the security they are guaranteed for their ideas and products and the 
ability of governments to enforce royalty and contractual obligations. Increased FDIs 
are not only important for the economic benefits to periphery states, they also allow 
for the transfer of knowledge and information from core states to periphery states. The 
second argument of the IP regime is that it allows for the dissemination of 
information; inventors allow the flow of information into the market knowing that 
they are compensated for it, thus increasing innovation growth that builds on previous 
ideas. Consequently, the argument is that global IP regimes allow for growth and 
development to all parties.98  
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E. The Anti-Patent Movement  
Unlike proponents of the IP regime, the anti-patent movement proposes several 
arguments to explain the adverse effects of IPs on economic growth and development. 
They range from holding back development and advancement in new fields because 
of high royalties, to the lack of evidence supporting the need for profits from patented 
products outside core states.  The first argument is that patents are harmful as they are 
means to shift the focus of inventors from advancements in their field to making 
profits.99 It shifts the focus to monetary gains and business profitability, which in 
many industries hold back innovation. This has drastic effects in fields such as 
healthcare and medicine, where advances are necessary for the survival and 
improvement of life. This previously described trend of holding back new 
developments from reaching the market is described by the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) as “pay to delay”. An example, published by the UK 
Office of Fair Trading, showed that between 2001 to 2004 four pharmaceutical 
companies delayed the supply of paroxetine, a widely known anti-depressant, in the 
UK so that GlaxoSmith Kline could monopolize and benefit from the sale of Seroxat - 
an anti-depressant - in the British market.100  
IPs, via several means, place economic and social costs on periphery states 
that they cannot afford.  The first reason is that many people are employed through 
copying unauthorized goods, and thus there are employment losses if they are unable 
to reproduce such goods. Moreover, the cost of essential products like food and 
pharmaceuticals become unaffordable when produced by monopolizing companies for 
people in periphery states. The effect is the lack of essentials of life. Governments of 
such countries cannot afford to subsidize products imported at monopoly prices, as is 
the case with food and pharmaceuticals. In this case, the end result is lack of access. 
IPs not only limit the availability of essential products but also the information to 
imitate them. For example, many countries, like Brazil and India, have been able to 
build their industries through the available knowledge of products in the markets and 
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the ability to reverse engineer them, without which the industries of such countries 
would not have been able to prosper. The pharmaceutical industry in India provides an 
excellent example of this, and is discussed in full in the final chapter of this thesis.101 
F. The International Institutionalization of IPRs 
As previously stated, the Paris and Berne Conventions marked the first step towards 
the internationalization of the IP regime. The coming into effect of these Conventions 
and the need to establish bodies to administer them lead to the creation of the United 
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI).  BIRPI was 
the predecessor of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized 
UN agency aimed at promoting the globalization of intellectual property rights.   
1. Establishment of BIRPI and WIPO 
The BIRPI and WIPO marked the global institutionalization of IPs. BIRPI was 
established in 1883 in the city of Berne, following the adoption of the Paris 
Convention, as a mechanism for administering both the Berne and Paris Conventions. 
Its membership was dominated by core states to promote awareness and protect the IP 
system. It also attempted but failed to pursue an IP agenda that took into account 
periphery states’ needs. After almost a century, WIPO, the successor to BIRPI, was 
established in 1970, and in 1974 was recognized as a UN agency. WIPO, an 
intergovernmental organization, aimed at the “protection of IP throughout the world 
through cooperation among states.”102 It distinguished itself as an agency that 
recognized the problems of developing countries and put as its main goal helping such 
countries into the world economy. A proponent of IP, its aim was to engage more 
periphery states in implementing IPs as a method of economic development, through 
arguing that it helped increase FDI and therefore technology transfer. The reality was 
that WIPO was a mechanism for informing periphery states that implementing IPs 
was necessary for economic integration into the world system. Instead of taking into 
account the different social, economic, cultural and political needs of different 
periphery states, WIPO pressured states into accepting the already established IP 
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regime and working within its boundaries103. The problems within WIPO were that for 
core states it had a weak implementation mechanism of the Paris and Berne 
Conventions; and for periphery states, they realized that multinational corporations 
funded and controlled WIPO’s activities.104  
With the failure of WIPO to create a strong trade regime, and the growing 
political and economic pressures within core states to establish a strong international 
IP regime, it became necessary for core states to establish a new institution that would 
serve the interest of core states through promoting the agenda of IPs. The 
establishment of the WTO provided such an opportunity. The WTO was meant to 
provide a forum for equal treatment among states. However, this proved not to be the 
case. The WTO is seen as a mechanism to further the agenda of core states with 
regards to trade and also IPRs through the TRIPs agreement. In discussing the 
establishment of the WTO and creation of TRIPs, the following chapter shows that, 
while core states pushed for the establishment of a stronger IP regime, periphery 
countries fought against it, but were ignored and pressured to accept TRIPS.   
 
 
 
 
III. Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals under The TRIPs Regime 
Access to medicines is a pressing, global issue, closely linked to trade and 
intellectual property issues. We do not know how long the health systems of 
industrialized countries can continue to meet the increasing cost of 
reimbursements given the emergence, for example, of very costly new drugs to 
treat such widespread conditions as cardiovascular diseases or cancer, 
treatments that will be developed and patented on the basis of research into the 
human genome—even though this research is publicly funded.105  
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Three out of four people living in periphery states do not have regular access to 
medicine. The global percentage of sales of medicines in periphery countries accounts 
for only 8% annually of global sales.106 This means that the average spending per 
capita in core countries is more than 100 times that in periphery countries. This is a 
result of the monopolized prices of medicine as a result of patent laws. This coupled 
with the lack of purchasing power of periphery states results in lack of ability to buy 
medicines. Consequently, the supply of medicines in periphery countries is very low.  
This directly affects the healthcare and wellbeing of people living in periphery 
countries. International law should promote one of the most basic of human rights, the 
right to health. Instead, the TRIPS agreement provides a clear example of the use of 
international law to advance center states’ agenda over the periphery while ignoring 
the basic right to health. To understand how this is achieved an analysis of the TRIPS 
agreement how it came about, and an assessment of the arguments for and against 
patent rights in the particular context of pharmaceuticals is necessary.  
A. Historical Analysis of The TRIPs Agreement 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is 
an agreement under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Any 
member state of the WTO has to apply TRIPS in its national law.107  The WTO 
defines intellectual property rights as “rights given to persons over the creations of 
their minds. They usually give the creator an exclusive right over the use of his/her 
creation for a certain period of time.”108 Intellectual property rights extend to different 
areas such as copyrights and patent rights. However, as this thesis focuses on health 
and medicines, patent rights are the focus.  
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An historical analysis of the TRIPS agreement reveals that it only reflects the 
interests of core state and multinational companies within such states, while ignoring 
the calls and needs of periphery states demonstrating the continued colonial relation 
between core and periphery states discussed by Anghie. Adopted on April 15 1994 in 
Marrakesh, TRIPs was an essential topic of discussion during the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the establishment of the 
WTO. GATT was established in 1948 and was the single most important 
multinational agreement in international trade. Until the establishment of the WTO in 
1995, GATT set the main legal economic, financial and trade principles on the 
international scene, and was the only organization successful in maintaining such a 
regime in one sole organization for 48 years. In parallel, the IP regime was managed 
through WIPO, which administered the Berne and Paris Conventions. However, with 
the growing importance of technology and information and their protection for 
multinationals in core states, multinationals lobbied politicians for increased 
protection, especially with the increase in copying and counterfeiting by developing 
states. The result was that in the Uruguay Round of 1986 to 1994, the eighth and last 
round of the GATT, the focus was on the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization, with a special focus given to strengthening the IP regime through the 
TRIPs agreement.109  
The TRIPS agreement, which became obligatory on all signatories to the 
WTO, is an expansion of the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property 
and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It was 
established to provide adequate standards of protection for intellectual property and 
provide greater predictability and stability in international economic relations. 
Although it was a continuation of the IP regime its novelty was, first, in setting 
minimum standards for the global application of an IP regime; second, in its creation 
of “detailed rules on enforcement rights before judicial administrative authorities; and  
third, the creation of a binding and effective mechanism to settle disputes between 
states.”110 During the Uruguay Rounds, a coalition of 100 participating multinational 
corporations (MNCs) pushed governments to strengthen protection against 
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counterfeiting. On the other hand, periphery states argued intensely about the 
disadvantages that further development of patent rights protection would bring.  They 
also argued that the WTO was not the forum to discuss this issue and WIPO was the 
appropriate forum. This tension was reflected in the negotiation process, and is the 
main reason why the first three years of the rounds were stalled. 
 A mid-term review lead by India and Brazil in Montreal highlighted this 
polarization. Their main argument was that IPRs belonged outside the context of 
GATT and belonged to WIPO instead. They also expressed major concerns about 
TRIPS effect on technology transfer, especially the “increased costs of pharmaceutical 
and agrochemical products.” 111 Periphery states feared that the new IP regime would 
negatively affect primary industries, which in turn affects the well-being of their 
people and their economic growth. They contended that the “TRIPs Agreement would 
mean the surrender of sovereignty over national development objectives and the 
denial of access to technology”.112 Developed countries argued that TRIPS would 
increase domestic research and development (R&D), and would not harm the 
availability or pricing of agrochemical products or pharmaceutical products.  
Surprisingly to developing states, when the draft agreement was proposed, none of 
their concerns had been included, following intense pressures especially by the US 
regarding the placement of bilateral trade sanctions on the periphery states. Moreover, 
periphery states had very limited expertise in IP issues and trade and did not work 
well together for their own benefit in this regard, and thus did not realize the full of 
effect of applying IPs in the manner proposed in TRIPS.113 Additionally, they thought 
that by giving up IPs they would gain benefits in other areas such textiles and 
agriculture – benefits that in fact did not eventually materialize.114 Such benefits were 
supposed to come as a result of decreased tariff and non-tariff restrictions in areas like 
textiles and agriculture, the main exports and comparative advantage of periphery 
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states. The reality was that this did not happen, and core states still set tariff and non-
tariff restrictions in such areas, even after the adoption of the WTO and TRIPS.  
The period of negotiations of the WTO and TRIPS coincided with debt crisis 
in periphery countries, faced as a result of loans they had taken out from the Bretton 
Woods institutions following decolonization. Having emerged as newly independent 
states with very weak economies, and in debt to pervious colonizers, periphery states 
borrowed from international banks as well as developed states and the IMF in order to 
develop, and were unable to pay back such loans leading such countries into a 
sovereign debt crisis. In the aftermath of the debt crisis, debtor countries were forced 
to adopt liberal economic policies by lenders such as the IMF. Such policies included 
opening up borders against tariff and non-tariff restrictions as well as protection of 
intellectual property rights. Thus, several periphery countries were forced to accept 
the WTO and along with it TRIPS as a condition of getting more loans and aid from 
the IMF and World Bank.115 
TRIPs was adopted as a mechanism for setting minimum standards of IP 
protection and establishing adequate mechanisms of conflict resolution with regards to 
IP issues.116 TRIPs imposes three main obligations on its members: first, it sets 
minimum standards for a global IP regime to be applied at the domestic level of 
signatory states. These standards were novel because they went beyond the standards 
of the Berne and Paris Conventions and because they set an unprecedented minimum 
guideline. Second, it requires members to have in place an effective mechanism for 
imposing such requirements. Finally, it also requires WTO members to submit to 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the event that disputes arise over a patent, copyright 
or any IP measure mentioned in the agreement. All these requirements translated into 
a new global IP regime based on Western ideologies, economic, political, and 
administrative standards, all of which were identified as lacking in periphery states 
and thus demanding significant legal reform.  
B. The Content of TRIPs  
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The main objective of TRIPs is set out in Article 7 and states that the aim of the 
agreement is transfer and dissemination of information and technology, and balancing 
rights and obligations of users and producers. The reality is that high royalties over 
patented technology has resulted in the decreased transfer of information and 
technology to periphery states.117 Article 8 was developed because of concerns that 
were voiced by developing nations; with 8.1 stating that:  
 
In amending national laws and regulations, members may adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition and to promote the public 
interest in sectors vital to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are within the TRIPs 
Agreement.118 
Article 8.2 further states that: 
 Appropriate measures may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights, or the use of practice which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect international technology transfer, provided that such 
provisions are consistent with the TRIPs Agreement.119  
 
The patent subject matters outlined in articles 27 to 34 established high protections; 
this includes inventions of both products and processes so long as they are “new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application”.120 Moreover, 
Article 33 requires patent law to afford a minimum of 20 years to the patent holder, 
and hold a monopoly over all aspects of this patency. Article 28, regarding the rights 
conferred by patents on their owner, in conjunction with Article 31 regarding other 
uses without authorization of the rights holder, limit the extent to which countries can 
engage in compulsory licensing of either a product or a process without the prior 
consent of the patent holder. 
These stipulations have had a deleterious effect on periphery states. Prior to 
the integration of TRIPS into the WTO, countries especially periphery states, 
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facilitated and encouraged the flow of information and technology to aid the 
development process. Countries such as India and Brazil used this technology transfer 
to aid their industries, especially in the areas of pharmaceuticals and health care. 
Pharmaceutical industry protection has been one of the biggest areas of debate since 
the application of the TRIPs. In periphery states, poverty is a result of several 
dynamics. One of them is the lack of proper healthcare, which is directly related to 
limited technological progress in pharmaceuticals in developing countries. The lack of 
government funds to finance the increasing cost of medicine affect the importation of 
products and technology due to monopolized prices by multinationals holding patency 
over such products and technology.121  
C. The TRIPS Agreement, Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals 
With growing epidemics of HIV and Hepatitis C and other treatable and preventable 
diseases in periphery countries, the questions scholars such as TWAIL-ers attempt to 
address is how periphery states can work around this unjust system and what legal 
arguments may be advanced in support of periphery states.  
1. Core Countries Perspective 
The need for patent rights in pharmaceuticals remains contentious. There are 
several justifications that economists and the pharmaceutical industry propose to 
justify why patenting is essential nationally and internationally. The first justification 
for having robust IP system for pharmaceutical products is that drug patents provide 
social welfare commodities and has economic externalities that benefit society by 
prompting the creation of new medicines. This outweighs the social welfare costs. The 
argument is that although society does have to pay in many cases large amounts of 
money to have access to medicine especially under a patent system, the availability of 
such medicines, which benefit the social good as a whole, outweighs the price that 
society has to pay. Their second justification, which supplements the first, is that “the 
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pharmaceutical firms deserve the financial returns made possible by strong patent 
protection because they have invested so much effort and money — and run such big 
risks — in producing their socially valuable products.”122 The argument is that 
because they take such huge risks in investing money into research and development, 
that in turn benefit society, then they have the right to profit greatly from such 
investments.  PHARMA president Gerald Massinghoff posits that the continuation of 
research and development technology depends on “the extent to which foreign 
governments allow innovators to be rewarded for their inventiveness, monetary 
investment, and intellectual labor”,123 and there needs to be incentives for investors 
through the guarantee of financial return through patent protection.124 The main 
argument thus revolves around reaping the financial rewards of the investment made 
in R&D to develop the drugs, and that the developed nations alone should not be held 
responsible for paying back the money invested in this. Thus, if profits are not 
protected, pharmaceutical companies will stop producing new drugs, which will leave 
the whole world worse off.  
 The second argument for implementing a strong IP regime is an increase in the 
level of FDI by multinational pharmaceutical companies in periphery states, as they 
feel safe that their innovations and products will be protected. There will be an 
increase in the levels of technology transfer and/or licensing because there is a secure 
legal environment which “will ultimately lead to the transfer of know-how and 
expertise that will contributed to local economic growth”.125 The contention here is 
that technology transfer happens because of the publication of patented information, 
which stimulates inventions in developing countries. Consequently, this will lead to an 
increase in the number of innovations in the field domestically, which in turn will help 
the economy as well as the people over the long run.126  
The third significant argument, with regards to human rights, is found in the 
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TRIPS agreement’s articles 7 and 8, which allow for exceptions to patent law to 
accommodate human rights. Article 7 specifies the objectives of TRIPS and states that 
IP protection should facilitate technology and information transfer:  
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to 
a balance of rights and obligations.127 
Article 8 acknowledges and allows member countries to adopt measures to promote 
the public interest in sectors that are vital to their individual socio-economic and 
technological development: 
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights 
by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology. 
Consequently, it is contended that Articles 7 and 8 provide a mechanism for 
exceptions to the application of patent laws, as well as preventing the monopolization 
of the patent holder when it is a matter of advancing the public good.  
Complementary to the flexibility provided in Article 8, Article 32 relating to 
compulsory license states that under Article 31 the rights of patent holders can be 
circumvented in certain situations. More specifically, member governments are given 
the authority to grant a license to a party willing to commercialize an invention 
protected under patent without the consent of the patent holder. Unless there is a 
“national emergency”, the proposed licensee is required to make reasonable efforts to 
seek a voluntary license. If the patent holder refuses to grant a license, the government 
can grant a non-exclusive license. Consequently, subject to other provisions of the 
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TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licensing allows generic drug companies to 
manufacture patented drugs and sell them at a fraction of the price that the patent 
holder might, since only the costs of producing the medication and not the costs of 
research and development need to be recovered.128 
2. The Problem with Patents Under International Law 
The TRIPS agreement is very problematic as it contradicts other fundamental 
international laws. International human rights law, including the right to health and 
the right to life, are impeded by IP laws that prevent the availability of medicine. In 
general, the agreement narrows developing countries’ access to technology and 
discourages the rapid diffusion of new technology needed for economic growth, 
although the aim of the agreement as stated during the Uruguay round is the diffusion 
of technology and helping in the development and growth of underdeveloped states.129 
In addition to the contradictions brought about within the general scope of 
international law by the IP regime, as well as a result of the actual application of IPRs 
and the general purpose of the agreement there are problems within the agreement 
itself.   Although articles 7, 8 and 31 allow for exceptions to override patent rights, 
there are two major problems that render these exceptions ineffective. The first is that 
governmental approval is required to override the patency of a drug. This is virtually 
impossible since developed countries continue to dominate the global IP system.  
Politicians and multinational company lobbyists profit from adherence to patent laws 
and play a hand in the formation of government policies and legislation that it is not in 
their interest to reform. Second, developing nations frequently do not have the 
infrastructure to produce sophisticated drugs.   
As stated by Syed and Fisher, 9 million people die annually because of 
diseases that can be prevented but are not because of the lack of affordability and 
availability of those drugs in the periphery. This is a result of several factors: 
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First, the majority of the most effective drugs are covered by patents, and the 
patentees typically pursue pricing strategies designed to maximize their profits. 
Second, pharmaceutical firms concentrate their research and development (R& 
D) resources on diseases prevalent in Europe, the United States, and Japan — 
areas from which they receive 90-95% of their revenues — and most of the 
diseases that afflict developing countries are uncommon in those regions.”130 
By comparison, the same diseases cause the death of nearly 200,000 lives a year in the 
developed world.131 Moreover, data shows that there was no increase in R&D and the 
creation of new chemical or medicines following the application of TRIPs. In the 
period between 2007 and 2011, the number of new chemical or biological entities 
launched on the world market fell in one decade from 196 to 149.132 Patent laws 
effectively contributed to an increased percentage of the number of people dying from 
curable diseases as a result of lack of availability of medicine. Moreover, the IP 
regime made no contribution to promoting research and development in the field of 
pharmaceuticals.  
There are several arguments that propose how allowing the reproduction of 
medicines at lower prices would benefit developed nations. One is ensuring that 
diseases such as infectious diseases do not spread, especially with the frequency of 
international travel. The spread of the Ebola virus in the past year, for example, shows 
how interconnected our world is. Consequently, eradicating disease in periphery states 
through allowing removal or exception to patent rights, and allowing the production of 
generic medicines and/or parallel importation of cheap medicine, benefits the world as 
a whole.  Moreover, the development of a strong health care system through the 
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availability of medicine translates economically into a healthier work force.133   
With regard to the argument of returning the cost of money spent on R&D, 
Syed and Fisher argue that the average citizen in developed states on average pays 
$100 per year to patented medicines. This means that, in a period of 8 to 10 years, 
R&D investments made by pharmaceutical companies are profitable to them, even if 
they only depend on income from core states. Thus, although profits made by firms 
are hard to assess because of the financial secrecy of firms, the bottom line is that 
“despite recent setbacks, the firms are still making plenty of money, substantially 
more than comparable firms in other industries. And the reforms we advocate would 
cut only modestly into their profits.”134 In Syed and Fisher’s view, those involved in 
R&D do deserve a fair reward for their labor and medical creations: 
the profits necessary to sustain incentives for pharmaceutical research — profits 
which, as indicated above, would still be reaped after adoption of our proposed 
reforms — seem more than adequate to supply the firms the “just deserts” to 
which they are entitled because of the effort their employees expend.135 
Keep in mind that the return of investment in R&D is in addition to profitability made 
regardless of the application of patent laws in developing countries.  
Lock argues that “parties contribute to a socially valuable product, they 
deserve rewards commensurate with their respective contribution.”136 With drug 
patents, the pharmaceutical innovations are “publically funded federal and university 
labs in which the majority of basic midstream biomedical research is carried out”,137 
and thus subsidized by governments.  Most research into new medical breakthrough 
come from labs funded by government sectors either in universities or through grants. 
After such research has been done, it is bought by multinationals who patent it and 
benefit, although the reality is that the public through the government funding has 
actually paid for it.  
Additionally, adequate knowledge can be achieved by limiting the duration of 
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exclusivity rights to the time taken for a field practitioner to have independently come 
up with the invention, which in most cases amounts to much less than the 20 years set 
in TRIPS.138 As previously discussed, investors usually make back their money in 
addition to profitability within 10 years of the release of the medical product. Thus, 
decreasing the ceiling internationally of the duration of IPs will not only guarantee the 
rights of the patent holder, but also allow periphery countries the ability to recreate the 
drug within a shorter period of time than is currently possible.   
D. Legal Analysis of TRIPs  
Having established that the current system is built on the needs of core states and 
serves their interests and the interests of multinationals through international regimes 
like the IP regime, the question is how to move forward and create a fairer and more 
balanced system. One of the problems within periphery states, which has helped the 
rise of the IP regime, is the lack of legal knowledge in such states and awareness of 
the consequences of their actions when signing TRIPS. Because developing states had 
little or no experience legally with regard to the IP regime, they were not able to 
defend their arguments during the Uruguay Rounds. Further, they did not fully realize 
the consequences of the application of IPs on their industries, nor the legal and 
administrative mechanisms needed to uphold such a system. Given that core states 
continue to dominate the economic, political and legal field internationally it would be 
unrealistic to argue today for a comprehensive revamp of the system.  
That is not to say that challenges to the system cannot be successful. India, 
provides a good case study as to how periphery states can formulate IP laws that both 
abide by the rules of TRIPS, while at the same time protect and foster the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry. To appreciate the Indian example, there needs to be a legal 
understanding of TRIPs and how states can use its mechanisms to decrease the level 
of IPs in the pharmaceutical industry and initiate economic growth within their 
borders. The Doha Declaration, which “mandates that the agreement be interpreted in 
a manner that supports public health interests and promotes access to medicines for 
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all”,139 can be used as a tool to interpret TRIPs in a new manner that helps periphery 
states. In reinterpreting articles 30 and 31, periphery countries can find more flexible 
policy options with regard to compulsory licensing and parallel importation to 
increase the supply of low-price medicines and vaccines. This is one mechanism that 
can be used under the current system to combat its biased and harmful impact on 
periphery states.  
1. Analysis of Article 30 and 31 and Article 8 
An analysis of articles 30 and 31 read in the context of Article 8 reveals that there is a 
space for TRIPS members to allow for exceptions to patent rights, for parallel 
importation of cheaper products and for compulsory licensing. Article 8(1) allows the 
adoption of necessary measures to protect public health provided it is “consistent” 
with the terms of TRIPS. This sets the basis for the adoption of internal measures to 
protect the interests of the states within the parameters of the agreement. The 
constraint is that the measures they adopt should not violate the terms of the 
agreement. For this reason, many states believe that there are measures that can be 
taken to push the boundaries of the agreement. However, this Article read in light of 
Articles 30 and 31 reveals otherwise.  
a. Article 31 on Compulsory Licensing 
Compulsory licensing is an essential exceptional element of the TRIPS agreement, 
which can have a positive impact on the production and availability of medicine in 
periphery states. Compulsory license is “when a government allows someone else to 
produce the patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner.”140 It 
is considered one of the most important mechanisms in addressing the public welfare. 
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Periphery states may use it to increase the supply of low priced drugs through 
allowing their local producers to produce the drug or import it under a compulsory 
licensing agreement with the patent holder. However, the right to apply compulsory 
licensing is attached to certain conditions. First, there must be a party within such a 
country that has the technical ability to produce the product. This requires technical 
and financial capacities. Second, there must be sufficient purchasing power to justify 
the investment. This means that unless a country can show the need to produce such 
medications, the ability for its government is subsidize it to make it affordable, or for 
its people to afford it on their own, compulsory licensing will be precluded. Finally, 
there needs to be adequate compensation for the patent holder. Without this, 
compulsory licensing would be seen as illegal under TRIPS.  
Although the terms of Article 31 are generally flexible with regard to the 
grounds for permitting the licensing and administrative process, there are still 
problems with its application. Two problems are the wording of the Article and the 
effects of applying it. With regards to the legal application, TRIPS establishes several 
obstacles to the actual application of compulsory licensing. The most widely noted 
obstacle is found in section (f) of Article 31 which states that “any such use (of 
compulsory licensing) shall be authorized predominantly from the supply of domestic 
market of the Member authorizing state”. This limits the importation of products from 
countries that have already applied compulsory licensing. This means that very poor 
developing countries with no mechanism for producing through compulsory licensing 
still do not have the ability to import such products.  Also, the word “predominantly” 
means that most of the production, more that 50% should be for the supply of local 
markets. Thus, half of the amount of produced goods under compulsory licensing 
must be distributed in local markets. This is to limit parallel importation because, 
through limiting the exportation of products under compulsory licensing as much as 
possible, this limits the degree of infringement on the rights of the patent holder. The 
limitation of 31(f) has two interlinked problems: First, it limits the ability of countries 
unable to support the production of drugs to import them at lower prices from those 
countries who reproduce it. Second, countries able to produce generic drugs have less 
incentive to do so because of limitations on meeting the demand for such drugs.  
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A third issue that arises with Article 31 concerns the remuneration to the 
patent holder when compulsory licensing is applied. Section 31(h) states that 
 “The right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the 
authorization. The remuneration requirement depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case and may take into account various factors, including 
(but not limited to) the economic value of the authorization.”141 
In many cases such compensation to the patent holder, which is either adjudicated or 
set through administrative mechanisms, can be of high value or can be through the 
dispute settlement mechanism of TRIPS, which can take a lengthy period of time and 
a lot of legal expertise and resources. Additionally, minimum standards for 
compensation need to be met, taking into account the balance between public welfare 
and amount of royalties of patented products, and balancing them off. Article 31(k) 
expressly recognizes, “the need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into 
account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases.” If a compulsory 
license is issued to remedy a situation in which the patent holder has unfairly 
benefited, the remuneration may be correspondingly diminished.  
One solution to the problem of Article 31 is the creation of regional market 
arrangements. Much like what the EU has created, creating an economic bloc that 
functions as a representative of periphery states interest would mean that countries in 
such blocs are treated as one domestic border. The countries with the capability to 
reproduce drugs can thus produce drugs under the Article of compulsory licensing, 
guaranteeing that any investment made is returned with profit, aided by the knowledge 
that there will be high demand because of consolidating an economic bloc. Moreover, 
countries with no ability to produce can import it without the “predominant” 
requisition since it would be all within one border.142 Another mechanism to address 
the issues of Article 31 is the creation of pharmaceutical production export zones, 
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which operate much like free trade zones, and allow for cooperative production 
among periphery states.143  
b. Article 30 on Exceptions to Rights Conferred 
Article 30 is considered one of the most important opportunities for developing 
countries. The Article provides an exception to overriding the rights of a patent 
holder:  
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties. 
Article 30 expressly allows exceptions to patent rights under specific conditions. This 
means that certain activities can be defined under national laws as an exception to the 
patent holder and yet are not seen as infringements on the patent itself. This exception 
can include a “production for export” exception, which means “that the necessary 
production for export could take place without being an infringement of the patent.”144 
It also means that countries would have the capacity to produce their own 
pharmaceutical products.145 The use of the expression “exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner” balances the 
interests of those periphery states with those of patent holders.  
As previously stated, patent holders of pharmaceutical products can guarantee 
a return on investment in addition to profits through the exploitation of their patent 
rights in developed states alone. It is therefore logical to conclude that providing legal 
exceptions to patent rights in periphery countries does not necessarily affect the 
commercial and financial interests of the patent holder, and provides grounds for 
allowing the production and importation of reproduced drugs to periphery states.  
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IV. India, Egypt, and Some Ways Forward 
Having examined the history of the IP regime and the creation and application of 
TRIPs, and recognizing the dire effects it has had on periphery states after the 
application of the new IPR regime, the question is what can be done? The case of 
India provides an excellent example of how a country was able to move from having 
no pharmaceutical industry whatsoever, in one of the largest and poorest countries in 
the world, to having one of the strongest domestic pharmaceutical industries in the 
world. It also provides mechanisms for utilizing the flexibilities within the TRIPs 
agreement to structure domestic IPR laws that are both compliant with TRIPs and able 
to protect domestic interests. This chapter describes the development of the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry in parallel with the development of Indian patent laws.  It 
then investigates and compares the Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry to the Indian 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the similarities and differences between both IP 
regimes within both countries. Finally, it deduces the lessons learned from both cases 
and what can be done to improve legislation in Egypt, and how it can be applied to 
other periphery states.  
A. India 
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India’s achievements in the pharmaceutical industry since its independence are 
remarkable. It provides an example of how to create an industry within the current 
global system, as well as substantiates the linkage between healthcare, access to 
medicine, economic growth, and development. The legal framework of the Indian 
patent system has gone through three major historical periods that shape the way the 
industry operates today.   
The first was during the colonial era and ended in 1970. It was implemented 
under British Administration through the Indian Act VI of 1856, which was based on 
the British Patent Law of 1855. It provided certain privileges to inventors for a period 
of 14 years. Patent granting was mainly given to British companies operating in the 
colony; domestic filing at the time was very low: “India had virtually no domestic 
pharmaceutical industry during the British colonial rule.”146 While the country 
industrialized, the pharmaceutical industry did not. By the time it gained 
independence, its health care system was in disarray. While it was one of the poorest 
countries in the world, it imported medicines in high volume and sold it at higher 
prices than in most western countries. Multinationals monopolized the little drug 
manufacturing that existed.147 Following its independence in 1947, India strived for a 
patent system tailored to its national needs. The government commissioned reports on 
the situation and in 1959 the Ayyangar Report revealed a situation that “multinational 
companies were exploiting India's patent system to achieve monopolistic control; 
foreigners held about 80-90% of Indian patents, but practiced less than 10% of those 
patents in India.”148  This report recommended radical reform, which came in 1970. 
This marked the beginning of the second stage of development in the Indian patent 
system.149 
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The second stage of patent development in India was the period from 1970 to 
1986. This period was known as the period that stimulated India’s generic drug 
manufacturing industry and set the country in the right direction. It revolved around 
the Indian Patent Act of 1970.  The 1970 Act revoked the patentability of 
pharmaceutical products and only allowed patenting of the process of making 
medicines. This Act was able to stimulate the then lagging pharmaceutical industry by 
promoting domestic drug manufacturing. As Linda Lee describes in her exploration of 
one of India’s recent and prominent patent cases: 
Over the ensuing years, India developed a worldwide reputation as a 
producer of low-price generic drugs. India is currently the biggest producer 
of generic drugs by volume and the leading exporter of medicine to 
developing countries and it supplies a large percentage of AIDS medicines 
used in developing countries.150 
Within a decade, the number of foreign owned patent files decreased drastically as a 
result of the reverse engineering of drugs that was taking place. The country was able 
to produce large quantities of generic drugs at low costs that not only fulfilled 
commitments of the needs of the nation, but also increased its exports of drugs 
dramatically. The effect today is that its domestic generic drug industry directly 
competes with drug manufacturers in the US and Europe. Indeed, India and Japan are 
the only two countries whose generic drug manufacturers compete with multinational 
corporations. The industry became divided among large companies who were not only 
engaged in producing generic drugs but in also doing original research and 
development. They operate alongside hundreds of other smaller companies and 
multinationals. For India, this has made the field extremely competitive. It employs 
large numbers of the population, and allows access to more affordable healthcare and 
medicines.  This is reflected in a growing middle class and expanding health 
industry.151 
The third and final stage of development is concerned with the Indian reforms 
of patent laws in the period starting 1989. Although an original member of the WTO, 
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India along with Brazil were the main opponents of the TRIPs agreement during the 
Uruguay Rounds. They argued that a patent system should not be universalized. 
Rather, it should be tailored to suit the domestic needs of each country. In spite of 
their resistance, due to the India’s weak economic situation in the 1980s, and the 
threat of bilateral economic sanctions by the US and other Western states, India like 
many developing countries was forced to agree to include TRIPs as part of the WTO. 
As a developing country, India was granted a grace period until 2005 to comply with 
TRIPs. For this reason, during the period between 1989 and 2005, the Indian Patent 
Act went through three main amendments. The first stipulated that the patent system 
must be developed during the transition period, and that the Indian Patent Office 
would examine applications when India began to grant pharmaceutical product 
patents.  The second amendment increased the term of patent rights to 20 years and 
modified the compulsory licensing and burdens of proof for infringement. Finally, it 
made pharmaceutical products patentable through the Patent Act of 2005. This was 
the final stage of development of Indian patent laws to ensure their compliance with 
TRIPS.  
 The Indian approach illustrates how it is possible to promote access to 
medicine while still implementing an IPR. India’s success in implementing TRIPS 
while still protecting its industries, lies in the manner which is was able to use the 
flexibly in the open definition of invention, as well as exceptions permitted until 
articles 30 and 31.152 An analysis of the Patent Act against the terms of the TRIPS 
illustrates how India protects its pharmaceutical industry while complying with 
TRIPS.  
1. Analysis of The Patent Act of 2002 
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India’s patent act is an excellent example of how to promote access to medicine while 
still abiding by the current global IP regime. With regard to the definition of 
invention, the TRIPs agreement Article 27 (1) states that: 
Patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or 
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve 
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application ... [and] patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced.153 
In other words, all processes and inventions are covered by this provision including 
pharmaceutical products.  
Since the definition of invention was left open to interpretation, India included 
within its own national patent law two exceptions that would help the development the 
pharmaceutical industry. The amendment of Article 3 clause j of the original act then 
modified in article 3 section (f) states that: 
(j) “Invention” means anew production or process involving an inventive step 
and capable of industrial application; 
(ja) inventive step means a feature that makes the invention not obvious to the 
person skilled in the art.154 
This means that the following are not patentable: new uses of known substances (for 
example a compound of a cream that treats acne to also be used for wrinkles) and new 
forms of known substances unless they are significantly different.155 However, this 
does not preclude their showing efficacy. This is not defined in Indian law but 
generally means a desired effect. In 2013, the Indian Supreme Court announced its 
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judgment in the Novartis v India, one of the most important judgments in the 
interpretation of the concept of novelty of invention under TRIPS. The Court 
concluded that Novartis, which produced Imantinib, a leukemia drug, applied in 1998 
for patenting of a new drug Glivec, which was a “beta crystalline form of Imatinib.”156 
The only novelty in the drug was that it absorbed 30% more easily in the bloodstream. 
After having its patent application rejected in India in 2006, Novartis filed  a case 
against the Indian government asserting that “Imatinib, was only the first step in 
developing the current version, and could not be administered to patients”157 and that 
only Gilvec is a viable treatment. For this reason, the new 30% absorption of the drug 
falls under a second generation patent. Novartis not only challenged the rejection of 
the patent right but also challenged the legality of section 3(d). The Supreme Court of 
India in its judgment held that the changes made in Gilvec were too minor to be 
considered as ‘efficacy’ under section 3(d). Further, it ruled that section 3(d) is legal 
under TRIPS and confirmed “the right of India’s Parliament to implement public 
health safeguards available under the TRIPS Agreement.”158 What it means for the 
industry is that it limits the pharmaceutical companies ability to extend their patent 
right over a compound or medicine making a minuscule change and then to ask for a 
new patent right to extend its monopoly over the product and preventing other 
companies from using the product. By setting this limitation, the general welfare of 
society is protected and it also helps with advancements of products.159 Article 3(d)’s 
compliance with TRIPS has been settled in the Novartis case. The Supreme Court 
found that, since the Article does not discriminate against a certain industry or 
technology, it complies with the flexibilities provided under TRIPS with regards to the 
definition of invention.160   
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A second feature of the Act allows for compulsory licensing. Article 31 of 
TRIPS read in light of Article 8(1), permits adopting measures necessary to protect 
the welfare of the state. Using the flexibilities of this article, the Indian Patent Act 
provides extensive grounds for issuing compulsory licensing under certain conditions. 
Such conditions include: the patent holder not satisfying the requirements of the 
public, excessively high pricing of medication making it unaffordable for the 
population, or not fully commercially exploiting, which means the patent holder fails 
to work/produce the patent locally.161  
Another feature of the Act is the provision concerning international 
exhaustion. This provision considers the patent exhausted without authorization by the 
patent owner after the first unrestricted global sale by the patent owner.162 This means 
that once the patent has been registered in another country, and the holder has initiated 
sale of the product or information globally, the patent holder cannot reapply for 
extending the patent right again in India. This limits abuse of the patent law by 
companies that otherwise reapply for patent rights in different countries at different 
times to extend the right granted. 
 Finally, the Indian Patent Act allows a regulatory exemption of patent rights 
for generic production drugs and use of research information. India permits what it 
calls the ‘mailbox’ application of patents. Under this rule, companies that produced 
generic drugs prior to the coming into force of the 2005 Act, are allowed to continue 
making such drugs, and that generic production would not constitute an infringement 
on the patent holder of the original drug.  As per Indian interpretation of TRIPS, this 
is in compliance with TRIPS Article 30.  
India has clearly been successful in using the wording and flexibility in TRIPs 
to cater to its own needs of having a huge generic drug manufacturing industry, and 
companies are able to compete with multinationals. This promotes FDI in the Indian 
pharmaceuticals industry. But India is not the only developing country with a 
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pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Other periphery states such as Brazil, Egypt, 
Kenya, South Africa, and Thailand also have such capabilities and also face 
increasing need with regards to diseases such as Hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS and cancer. 
Such countries also stand as regionally significant producers of medicine. As such, 
developing countries have been demanding changes in IP policies that suit their needs 
rather than one global regime that serves the needs of developed countries over those 
developing countries.  Moreover, developing countries that possess pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacities should not merely incorporate these key flexibilities into 
their national patent laws; they should equally take steps to encourage and facilitate 
the effective utilization of these flexibilities in order to enhance access to medicines 
for their citizens. This is why countries such as Brazil are attempting to reform their 
laws much like India has to suit their national needs.163 
B. Egypt 
Like India, Egypt after independence established a strong pharmaceutical industry, the 
strongest in its region, one that is considered the supplier of pharmaceuticals within its 
region. Egypt is one of the major producers of pharmaceutical in the Middle East and 
Africa; it contributes greatly to the distribution and availability of affordable 
medicines in the region through its manufacturing of generic drugs164. It generates 
approximately three billion Egyptian pounds annually and is an integral source of 
income for the country deriving valued foreign currency from the export of its 
products. The sector is comprised of 35 pharmaceutical factories, consisting of public 
sector, private sector, and joint venture companies as well as subsidiaries of several 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. The sector is considered to be highly 
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competitive and open to investment. Prices of drugs in Egypt are one-sixth of the 
prices compared to those produced by multinationals in spite of importing many raw 
materials, which are very expensive. An important feature of the industry is that the 
Ministry of Health controls drug pricing.165   
1. Historical Development of Patent Law in Egypt  
The historical development of patent law in Egypt is similar to that of India. It is 
characterized by two main developments: the creation of Law 132 of 1949 in its 
postcolonial era and the enactment of Law 82 of 2002 as part of fulfilling its 
obligations under TRIPS. Prior to the current IPR law set in 2002, patent law was 
covered under Law 132 of 1949.  Under this Act, pharmaceutical products were not 
patented; rather what was patented was the process of production. The term of 
protection for all inventions was fifteen years from the filing date and could be 
extended by five years for inventions; for the patents of processes of production of 
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, the term is ten years and not 
eligible for renewal. The main purpose for eliminating pharmaceutical patency was 
the protection of Egyptian companies from powerful multinational competitors and 
the encouragement of national industry. The result has been the emergence of a strong 
national industry developed enough to support strong regional export and 
continuously increasing sales and profits. The national industry has grown from 
generic production to original research and development.  
2. The New IPR Law 
Following the adoption of the TRIPs agreement, Egypt had to amend its patent law so 
as not to conflict with TRIPS. Law 82 of 2002 was adopted but came only into force 
in 2005 coinciding with the grace period given to developing members of the WTO.  
According to Article 1 of the Egyptian law, a patented invention should be novel, 
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include an innovative step, and be industrially applicable. Unlike the Indian law which 
has a specific definition and limitations sets on novelty, the Egyptian law is undefined 
and thus leaving it open to the opportunity for companies to pursue reverse 
engineering of production. The period for the patency increased to 20 years as per the 
minimum requirements of TRIPS. The law does set exclusions from patentability such 
as inventions that affect the public welfare and security of the state.  
The new IPR law in Egypt also has several features similar to the Indian law. First, 
like the Indian law, Egyptian law contains a doctrine of exhaustion following the first 
global sale and thus allows for parallel importation. Parallel importation allows for 
importing products at lower prices by the patent owner or anyone else with the 
authority. The effect of this is significant in disseminating lower priced products 
globally especially in developing countries like Egypt.166  
Exception and compulsory licensing are addressed in Article 17 of the new 
law, which entitles the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Military Production, Internal 
Affairs and Health to reject the patent application within the context of securing the 
welfare of the state. The problem is, unlike the Indian system, the Egyptian law is 
vague when it comes to the scope of the articles and procedures for implementing 
them. Further, the court systems are not specialized in the area of IP and find it hard to 
adjudicate in IP related cases. This is problematic since to comply with TRIPS the 
scope of the Article needs to fall within the object and purpose of Article 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, Article 23(1)(3) is designed to address the issue of 
developing the local pharmaceutical industry to deal better with the problem of access 
to necessary medicines. Article 23(2) expressly provides for the compulsory licensing 
of pharmaceuticals in a way that mirrors the French Intellectual Property Code’s 
provisions. It provides that the Minister of Health may impose a compulsory license 
on a patented pharmaceutical whenever the supply does not satisfy local need, the 
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pharmaceutical is of unacceptable quality, or is offered at an unreasonable price.167 
Although the new Egyptian law is similar to that of India’s, it does lag in 
certain aspects such as the lack of detailed administrative and judicial overview and 
the presence of trained government officials and lawyers who can deal within an IP 
regime. In addition, it is silent on monopolistic pricing, unlike the Indian law, which 
specifically addresses the issue and sets it as an exception to patent rights. A key 
element is that the Indian law protects generic production through having strict forms 
and definitions of innovation and through having the mailbox application system for 
drugs prior to the application of the law in 2005. Such elements, if integrated, would 
strengthen the Egyptian patent law and protect the already thriving pharmaceutical 
industry in Egypt, which is necessary in a country like Egypt with high poverty rates. 
The UNICEF statistical report of 2015 shows that 20.15% of the population are living 
below lower poverty line, and 49.6% below the upper poverty line. 168 
C. India’s Lessons for Egypt  
As discussed above, the Egyptian Patent law of 2002 is similar in many ways to that 
of India patent law. However, it would benefit further from adding other features 
found in the Indian Law. First, with regard to definition, although the Egyptian law 
does have an absolute definition of novelty, it does not link invention with production 
ability within the country. This leaves Egypt vulnerable to having patents registered in 
the country but not actually being produced in the country. This negatively affects the 
progress of the industry. Second, although the concept of mail boxing is available in 
Egyptian law, its meaning differs drastically from that of the Indian law. The Indian 
law, as discussed, focuses on previously produced unpatented drugs. It allows India’s 
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already existing pharmaceutical industry to continue to grow providing its people with 
affordable alternatives to multinational medicine.  Applying this in Egypt would 
benefit the country greatly as Egyptian generic production is a large reason for the 
availability of drugs, it is mostly what the industry is built on, and it supplies 30% of 
the total regional market.169 Thus is it integral to protect it as much as possible. 
Finally, while the Egyptian law might be strong in many aspects it needs to also be 
supported by a strong administrative revision board as well as a well-informed 
judiciary on IPs.  
D. A Step Forward with The Doha Round 
As a means of promoting the agenda of the WTO, the organization adopted 
mechanisms like the panel report and Round negotiations that take place every few 
years, to develop and discuss the trade and IP regime every decade, much like what 
GATT did. The Doha Round of 2001 was important for the IP regime and for 
developing countries since the focus of the Round was the discussion of the issue of 
availability and access to medicine and the effect of patent law on these issues in 
periphery states. With the HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C epidemics ravaging developing 
countries, core states could no longer ignore the demands of periphery states. 
Although the Round failed in addressing all of the concerns of periphery states, there 
were some successes. First, while it acknowledged the limitation of the compulsory 
licensing mechanism within the TRIPs agreement,  
members acknowledged that providing patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 
the developing countries would not encourage R&D expenditure for cures of 
local diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis given the low expected financial 
returns. This has been characterized by a number of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) including Oxfam, as the “fundamental imbalance in 
TRIPS.”170 
 
 Moreover, within the Doha Declaration, countries acknowledged the limitation of the 
compulsory licensing system in the access to medicines and availability of public 
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health care in periphery states, especially the ones that lack the technological 
capacities.171 Thus, the Declaration as a whole reinforces and restates the flexibilities 
in TRIPs. However, no real action was taken to amend the articles of TRIPs to suit the 
needs of periphery member states. In spite of this failure, in Abbott’s view, it was a 
positive step that reflected the higher level of cooperation between periphery states. 
This needs to be aided with more knowledge about IPRs and cooperation between 
periphery states.  
E. Conclusion 
The current international legal system is based on the needs of core states. As 
illustrated the current system is built on neo-colonial ideas and relationships between 
core and periphery states, that benefit core states and create a perpetual cycle of 
underdevelopment and poverty in periphery states. The IPR regime and its evolution 
until the creation and application of TRIPs is a clear example of this detrimental 
global world order. From its inception, the drafting of the TRIPS agreement reflected 
core states IP regimes and their corporate interests, and the controversial debates 
between core and periphery states showed the resistance of periphery states to accept 
IPs in the manner presented in the GATT Uruguay Round. It was only through 
economic and political pressure that periphery states agreed to TRIPS, which did not 
address their needs or voiced concerns. The effects of TRIPS on availability of 
medicines in periphery states has resulted in increased disease and deaths from 
curable diseases. As seen from the Indian and Egyptian examples, the industries have 
to develop, mainly through generic production and become strong first, in order to 
compete with Western multinationals and simultaneously have IP protection.  
It is undeniable that TRIPs creates a biased globalized IP system, within an 
already biased international global system, that aims to benefit already developed 
countries, at the expense of developing countries. It would thus be in the best interest 
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of periphery states to completely reject and change such a system. However 
realistically speaking, and as the failure of the New International Economic Order has 
demonstrated, the system at this point in time will not change to the benefit of 
developing countries. Thus, the solution is working within this system to benefit 
developing countries. India provides an example of how this can be done while 
dealing with TRIPs. The problem is that, even with such strategies, there needs to 
have been a domestic pharmaceutical industry to begin with. Both India and Egypt 
were able to do so by generically producing medicines through reverse engineering 
patented medicines, followed by growing an industry to a stage that it conducts its 
own research and development. The problem then lies with countries that have no 
infrastructure, information, knowledge or technology in the industry and what choices 
they have. If the status quo remains, periphery states can protect their industries 
through amending their laws to accommodate TRIPS as well as meet domestic needs, 
like India has done. However, there needs to be trained legal professionals able to 
draft legislation that protect industries. This will directly impact the availability of 
medicine, the ability of periphery states to eradicate curable diseases, and 
consequently build a healthy workforce able to push it towards its developmental 
goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
